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Background: Studies have found that children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are 
more likely to make errors in appropriately producing referring expressions (‘the dog’ vs. ‘the 
black dog’) than are controls but comprehend them with equal facility.  We tested whether 
this anomaly arises because comprehension studies have focused on manipulating 
perspective-taking at a ‘generic speaker’ level. 
  
Method: We compared 24 autistic eight- to eleven-year-olds with 24 well-matched neuro-
typical controls. Children interpreted requests (e.g. ‘Can I have that ball?’) in contexts which 
would be ambiguous (i.e. because the child can see two balls) if perspective-taking were not 
utilized. In the interlocutor-specific perspective-taking condition, the target was the particular 
object which was new for the speaker.  
Children needed to take into account what the speaker had played with before and the fact 
that they were now expressing excitement about something new.  In two control ‘speaker-
generic’ conditions we tested children’s ability to take the visual perspective of the speaker 
(where any speaker who stood behind a particular barrier would have the same perspective).  
  
Results: The autistic group were significantly less likely to select the target and significantly 
more likely to request clarification in the ‘interlocutor-specific’ condition. Performance in the 
‘interlocutor-generic’ (visual) perspective taking conditions did not differ between groups.  
  
Conclusion: Autistic children, even those who are not intellectually-impaired, tend to have 
more difficulty than neuro-typical peers in comprehending referring expressions when this 
requires understanding that people comment on what is new for them.  
 
  





One of the two key symptom domains for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) encompasses 
deficits in verbal social communication (DSM-5, APA, 2013). A significant hurdle to 
studying this atypicality is that, while we can readily notice it in everyday conversation, it is 
challenging to create experimental conditions that reliably elicit language which is 
appropriate (or not) for a given context. One type of language use that is so pervasive as to be 
open to experimental study is reference. Referring to something verbally requires selecting an 
expression (e.g., “the dog”, or “it” or “the dog over there with the red collar”) that is 
sufficiently, but not excessively, informative. Deficits in selecting appropriate referring 
expressions in production are characteristic of ASD (see Malkin, Abbot-Smith & Williams, 
2018, for a systematic review). That is, autistic individuals frequently fail to tailor language 
for specific interlocutors (conversation partners) (Volden, Magill-Evans, Goulden & Clarke, 
2007). In contrast, studies that have tested the comprehension of referring expressions have 
not observed significant ASD-specific difficulties with the ability to use the perspective of the 
interlocutor to interpret referring expressions. While this discrepancy is surprising, it is 
plausibly explained by the fact that studies of reference comprehension in ASD to date have 
only manipulated fairly simple forms of perspective-taking. It is therefore possible that 
autistic children experience difficulties in comprehending referring expressions when 
comprehension requires interlocutor-specific perspective-taking – i.e., consideration of 
mental content (knowledge, interests) relating to a specific individual and how this differs 
from the mental content of others. The purpose of the current study was to test this possibility 
with a reference interpretation task that required participants to consider what was ‘new’ to 
the interaction from the interlocutor’s perspective. 
 To understand the importance of this manipulation it is necessary to first consider the 
socio-cognitive abilities that are likely to be required in everyday interaction when 




interpreting referring expressions used by another speaker. For example, if your partner asks 
you to ‘pass the screwdriver’, when you can see two screwdrivers, to successfully understand 
which screwdriver is meant, you need to consider your partner’s perspective. In some sense, 
the listener needs to step into the speaker’s shoes in order to interpret which referent (here: 
which screwdriver) is intended. Most theorists agree that some type of Theory of Mind or 
Mentalising process, at least in a broad sense, must be involved in interpreting referring 
expressions in these types of situations (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Clark & Marshall, 1981). 
There are many potential dimensions to Mentalising. One dimension concerns whether the 
child needs to consider another’s affect (or emotional stance towards something) versus 
whether the child needs a cognitive understanding of the other individual (e.g. understanding 
what the individual does or does not know). Another dimension to Mentalising concerns the 
degree to which the child needs to consider whether various individuals might have differing 
perspectives (i.e. interlocutor-specific perspective-taking).    
Individuals with ASD tend to perform significantly less well on Theory of Mind 
measures than do neuro-typical peers (e.g. White, Hill, Happé & Frith, 2011). Moreover, 
difficulties with a dynamic consideration of the perspective of others in real time in more 
naturalistic situations (Peterson, Garnett, Kelly & Attwood, 2009) are strong predictors of 
social functioning (Berenguer, Miranda, Colomer, Baixauli & Rosello, 2018; Jones et al., 
2018). Yet, four out of the five studies of referring expression interpretation to date have 
found no significant differences between individuals with ASD and matched neuro-typical 
controls (TDs) (Begeer, Malle, Nieuwland, & Keysar, 2010; Malkin, Abbot-Smith, Williams 
& Ayling, 2018; Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird, & Heyes, 2015; Volden, Mulcahy, & 
Holdgrafer, 1997)1. One possible reason for this is that most of these studies only 
                                                          
1 The fifth study – by Schuh, Eigsti and Mirman (2016) - only found impairments relative to typical controls for their gaze fixations measure 
(and not for object selection accuracy). Crucially, even for the gaze fixations measure, the difference to typical controls was in fact subject to 
a three-way interaction between group, perspective-taking condition and working memory, whereby the Autistic group were more impaired 
than the neuro-typical group when required to use perspective-taking under high working memory load conditions. Thus, the impairment in 
the Autistic group did not appear to lie in perspective-taking ability, but rather they were more susceptible to the performance limitations 




manipulated interlocutor-generic perspective-taking; that is, the perspective of the speaker 
would be the same, regardless of the identity of the specific speaker.  A good example of why 
we consider these tasks interlocutor-generic is ‘the director task’, which is frequently used to 
assess how listeners interpret referring expressions (e.g. ‘the duck’ vs. ‘the big duck’). In this 
task, the participant and speaker (director) sit on either side of a grid containing various 
objects, some of which are occluded from the director’s view. Thus, when the director asks 
the participant to (for example) ‘Pick up the duck’, the participant needs to consider whether 
the director has visual access (or not) to both the ducks visible to the participant. Importantly, 
any interlocutor positioned in the director’s seat would have the same perspective in this task 
- the participant is not required to consider the potential differences between individuals in 
terms of their past experiences of or affect towards certain objects.   
In contrast, in many situations in everyday life, individuals need to consider the inter-
locutor-specific perspective of a speaker in order to successfully interpret referring expres-
sions. For example, in a scenario in which you and your partner can both see two screwdriv-
ers and she asks you to ‘Pass me the screwdriver’, the statement itself is underspecified (i.e. it 
would not, in itself, allow you to identify the referent).  However, if you have both previously 
established that only one of the two screwdrivers is suitable for the flatpack furniture you are 
constructing, then determining the referent would be straightforward. This type of perspec-
tive-taking requires you to consider knowledge which is specific to your partner by virtue of 
their past experiences and the common ground you have built up with them; you would not 
draw the same conclusion regarding referential intent if your partner were somehow replaced 
by another individual with no prior experience of constructing flatpack furniture. Thus, to uti-
lise interlocutor-specific perspective, a listener needs to consider individual differences in 
cognitive content (e.g. remembering what the partner does or does not know – either through 
                                                          
imposed by working memory. 




verbal transmission or by tracking his / her experience) or individual differences in affective 
stance (i.e. what certain people like or are interested in) (see Moll & Kadipasaoglu, 2013, for 
a similar discussion).  
To our knowledge, there is only one study to date that aimed to examine the role of in-
terlocutor-specific perspective-taking in the interpretation of referring expressions by chil-
dren with and without ASD (Malkin et al., 2018b: Study 1). In Malkin et al.’s (2018b) study, 
speaker perspective was manipulated in the following way. First, the participant partially con-
structed one toy (e.g. a woodpecker) with one experimenter (in the absence of the second ex-
perimenter), then the participant partially constructed a different toy (e.g. a telephone) with a 
second experimenter (in the absence of the first experimenter). Then, one of the two experi-
menters handed the participant a missing piece (e.g. string) that could complete either toy and 
told her ‘Now you can do it’. Success in the task required the child to track the experience of 
specific interlocutors; the target referent for the ambiguous pronoun ‘it’ was the one which 
was ‘old’ or ‘given’ information for the speaker.  Autistic children were just at good at this 
task as neuro-typical controls.   
Malkin et al.’s (2018) task certainly required participants to track the interlocutor-spe-
cific experiences and to trace the pronoun that the interlocutor used back to the discourse that 
was specific to that particular interlocutor. This is interesting, since this anaphor resolution 
must be carried out in an interlocutor-specific manner. However, it is possible that children 
did not really need to consider how their own perspective differed from that of another indi-
vidual in Malkin et al.’s task, which is still fairly simple compared to many of the real world 
perspective-taking situations that children regularly encounter.  It is certainly the case that 
(amongst other factors) Malkin et al.’s task did not require the participants to consider the af-
fective component of interlocutor-specific perspective-taking. This is important as affect in-
terpretation plays such a frequent role in reference interpretation and perspective-taking more 




generally in everyday life. There are two routes by which a listener might be able to deter-
mine an individual affect in everyday situation. The first simply requires interpreting the indi-
vidual’s bodily cues to their affect. However, since individuals very often conceal (or attempt 
to conceal) these bodily cues in everyday life, another important route to determining likely 
affect is through simulation (e.g. Harris, 1992). That is, if I know dislike it when Fred calls 
me names, then I can fairly safely assume that Tom also dislikes it when Fred calls him 
names.  
In the current study, we examined the ability to utilise interlocutor-specific perspective 
through this simulation route. That is, if I know that I tend to be more interested in toys that I 
have never seen before, then I can assume that the speaker is also more likely to be interested 
in a toy that she has never seen before. To investigate this, we adapted a paradigm developed 
by Tomasello and Haberl (2003) and Moll and Tomasello (2007). In the Moll and Tomasello 
(2007) paradigm, the child first jointly engages with the Requester (R) with one novel object 
and then a second novel object. At this point, R leaves the room and the child jointly engages 
with a second experimenter with a third novel object (the target). Finally, R returns to the 
room and says from the doorway ‘Wow! Cool! Give it to me!’ whereby the child and R can 
see three novel objects. Typically-developing toddlers are above chance in interpreting the 
referring expression ‘it’ as referring to the object that is new for the requesting experimenter 
(Requester). 
In contrast to the study by Malkin et al. (2018b), in this ‘excitement at the new’ 
paradigm, the child needs to understand that R is interested in the object that is new for R 
and, thus, likely to comment on this (see Clark, Schreuder & Buttrick, 1983). The ability to 
interpret R’s affect and the distinctive prosodic contour employed when commenting on new 
and exciting things would probably also play a role in this task. In sum, successful 
performance in this task may require the integration of several processes including an 




understanding of interlocutor-specific experience (and how this might result in one object 
thus appearing more salient), an understanding that others tend to comment on the new as 
well as the ability to interpret affect and prosody. The integration of these elements with the 
mechanisms of reference interpretation is a much more complex process than any previously 
manipulated in a reference interpretation task with individuals with ASD. However, these are 
the types of processes likely to be frequently required in interlocutor-specific perspective-
taking in spontaneous real-life interaction (see Graham, San Juan & Khu, 2017). 
In the current study, we tested autistic children and neuro-typical controls aged between 
eight and eleven years, matched on age, non-verbal IQ, receptive language, and gender. In 
our adaptation of Moll and Tomasello (2007), we told each child (C) that one experimenter 
(E2) had bought toys that the Requester (R) had not yet seen. For each trial, E2 passed one of 
these (e.g., pink ball) over to R, who discussed this with C. Then R left and E2 showed C 
another object of the same lexical type (e.g., yellow ball). When R returned, she and C could 
see both objects. R said “Oh wow, I like that ball. Can you put that ball in my box?”. The key 
dependent variables were object choice (i.e. whether the child selected the object that was 
new for R) and number of clarification questions (as a measure of uncertainty). Participants 
also completed two interlocutor-generic perspective-taking control conditions. As for the 
experimental (interlocutor-specific) conditions, the two interlocutor-generic conditions also 
involved a choice between two objects of the same lexical type (e.g. two cars) for each trial 
but required the child to take the interlocutor’s visual perspective into account. The first such 
interlocutor-generic condition aligned with previous studies in the literature in requiring the 
child to utilise information about what the speaker could perceive. The second interlocutor-
generic condition required the child to utilise information about how the speaker perceived 
each object (which colour they perceived it to be). 
  





Research Question 1: Are autistic children impaired relative to typical controls in their ability 
to take the ‘excitement at the new’ into account when interpreting referring expressions? 
We predicted that autistic children would select the correct object less often and would 
produce more clarification questions than would typical controls in the interlocutor-specific 
condition. In contrast, we predicted that there would be no significant between-groups 
differences on the interlocutor-generic control conditions for either dependent variable. 
 
Research Question 2: Are autistic difficulties with taking ‘excitement at the new’ into account 
related to impairments in affect recognition? 
Success in the Tomasello and Haberl (2003) / Moll and Tomasello (2007) paradigm 
could plausibly depend in part on the ability of children to recognise excitement on the part of 
the Requester. Autistic children have previously been found on average to have difficulty 
with affect recognition (e.g. Golan, Baron-Cohen & Golan, 2008). We therefore assessed all 
participants on a (standardised) non-verbal measure of affect recognition (NEPSY II, 
Korkman, Kirk & Kemp, 1998), which has been widely used in the ASD emotion recognition 
intervention literature (e.g. Williams, Gray & Tonge, 2012) and on which autistic children 
have been found to score on average lower than their typical peers (e.g. Loukusa, Maekinen, 
Kuusikko-Gauffin, Ebeling & Moilanen, 2014). We investigate, first, whether there are 
significant between-groups differences on the NEPSY II affect recognition measure and, 
second, whether there is a relationship between performance on this measure and our 










We tested 60 children aged between eight and eleven years, of which 32 were neuro-typical 
and 28 were autistic. From this sample, we excluded eight neuro-typical children because 
their IQ scores were too high to allow them to be matched and one child because his parent 
did not return the SRS questionnaire. We also commenced testing with but excluded four 
autistic children, two because they scored outside the typical range on either non-verbal IQ or 
receptive language and two because they became too distressed / non-compliant for testing. 
Our final sample thus consisted of 48 children with 24 in each diagnostic group. Of 
the neuro-typical group 15 were recruited through the Kent Child Development Unit database 
and the rest via three mainstream primary schools.  Of the autistic group, eight attended 
specialist provisions for autistic children, nine were recruited via a local county autism 
support service, six were recruited via the Kent Child Development Unit database and one 
was recruited via a mainstream primary school.  Children in the autistic group had been 
diagnosed within the British National Health Service either by a clinical psychologist or a 
paediatrician. Parents of children in both groups completed the Social Responsiveness Scale 
(SRS, Constantino & Gruber, 2007).  T-scores of 76 or higher are in the severe autism range.     
Autistic and neuro-typical children were matched on chronological age, core language 
and non-verbal IQ. To assess core language, we carried out a receptive language test, namely 
the Following Directions sub-test, from the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals® - 
Fifth Edition (CELF®-5, Wiig, Semel & Secord, 2013). To assess non-verbal IQ, we carried 
out the Matrix Reasoning subtest from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence II 
(Wechsler, 2011). The cognitive profiles of the final sample are shown in Table 1 below. 
Written consent was obtained from a parent of each individual child. Each individual child 
also gave his or her verbal assent.  




    
Table 1. Cognitive profile of the children who were included.  
 Autistic  
(n = 24;  
18 males) 
Neuro-typical 
(n = 24;      
18 males) 
 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p d 
Chronological Age in Months 120.04 (13.87) 118.13 (14.91) .65 0.13 
Receptive language scaled score1 10.13 (2.88) 10.71 (2.70) .47 0.21 
Non-verbal IQ T-score2 46.58 (8.92) 49.42 (6.87) .22 0.36 
Social Responsiveness Scale T-score 88.13 (4.22) 45.92 (7.02) < .001 7.40 
Theory of Mind Composite 3 3.52 (1.13) 4.27 (.93) .02 0.72 
1. Following Directions sub-test of CELF®-5 (Wiig, Semel & Secord, 2013)  
2. Matrix Reasoning sub-test of the WASI II (Wechsler, 2011) 
3. This consisted of one point for the first order change of location task (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie & Frith, 1985), three points for the ‘Birthday Surprise’ test of second order false belief 
understanding (Sullivan, Zaitchik & Tager-Flusberg, 1994) and two points for the ‘Kittens’ 
(white lie) vignette from Happé’s (1994) ‘Strange Stories’ (max. = 6 points). See Appendix B 
for details. 
 
Procedure and measures 
Overall Procedure 
The Requester (R) wore dark sunglasses during the study. On first meeting the child, R 
explained (showing the child a large box in which there were already toys) that she was busy 
organising a play event and would therefore have to often leave the room. The experimental 
trials were presented as ‘breaks’ from the standardised (non-verbal IQ, core language, 
NEPSY affect recognition) and Theory of Mind tests (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Happé, 
1994; Sullivan et al., 1994), and were interspersed between them. The order of administration 
of the standardized measures was: Receptive language, Non-verbal IQ, NEPSY II affect 
recognition and finally the Theory of Mind tests, which are outlined in the Appendix. After 




the test of receptive language, we counterbalanced across participants within each group 
whether children experienced an experimental (interlocutor-specific) trial first or a control 
(interlocutor-generic) trial first.  
 
Affect recognition:  
To assess affect recognition, we used the NEPSY II standardized measure (Korkman et al., 
1998). Initially, the participant is shown for each item a picture at the top of a page of a child 
with the facial affect of a basic emotion (happiness, anger, sadness, neutral, fear or disgust). 
The participant is asked to select from a series of faces at the bottom of the page the child 
(different child) ‘who feels the same way as the child at the top’. For some items, the 
participant has to select two target faces. For other items, the participant has to retain the 
affect in short term memory while selecting targets.  
 
Experimental task: interlocutor-specific perspective-taking ‘What is new for you?’ 
The child sat behind a table facing an open door. E2 sat at the short end of the table to the left 
of the child. R sat facing the child. In the interlocutor-specific perspective-taking condition, R 
first stated that E2 had just bought some toys that even R had never seen. E2 then pulled out a 
box and took out the first item (e.g. a Spiderman whose head turns around) and put it in the 
centre of the table whilst ensuring that neither R nor the child could see the remaining items 
in the box. R made a least two comments about the object to the child. These two comments 
were semi-scripted (e.g. R might say ‘Oh, a spiderman! He’s very bendy. Oh look – his head 
turns around like an owl’) but if the child made spontaneous comments about the object, R 
followed in on the child’s comments. Comments were always about the specific object and 
not about that type of object in general. R allowed the child to handle the object and they 
engaged in joint attention for around 10-20 seconds. E2 then put the first object back into the 




box and retrieved a second object of the same lexical type (e.g. a Spiderman holding a web 
shooter). R and the child again engaged in joint attention for 10-20 seconds focussed on the 
second object, again making two to three semi-scripted comments. For example, R might say 
“This spiderman seems to be holding a web shooter. Oh look! If you squeeze his legs like this, 
you can make the web shooter turn round”. During the handling of both objects, E2 did not 
comment and R was interested but not excited.  
R then made an excuse (e.g. ‘oh, I forgot I need to quickly speak to Mr X. Back in a 
minute’) and left the room, whereupon E2 pushed the second object to a corner of the table 
and brought out a third object of the same lexical type (e.g. a Spiderman with transparent legs 
and power boosters). Child and E2 engaged in joint attention with the third object for 10-20 
seconds. This was again partially scripted, as for R’s comments about the other two objects. 
For example, E2 might say ‘This looks like a water-filled Spiderman. He has power boosters 
on his feet. Would you like to hold him?”. E2 then ensured that the two objects (foil vs. target) 
were each in one corner of the table, to the left and right of the child, and coughed to signal 
that R could re-enter the room. R’s affect on appearing in the doorway was surprised and 
delighted. Neither object was occluded from R’s view. From the doorway she said “Wow! 
Look at THAT [TOY NAME]! Can you put that [TOY NAME e.g. ball] in my box?”. Since R 
stood equidistant from the two potential referents and was wearing dark glasses, this 
utterance was always ambiguous if the child did not take the prior shared experience with R 
into account. 
The target was the object that R had not previously seen (i.e. was ‘new’ for R) and the 
foil was the object with which the child had jointly engaged in attending to with R. There 
were three trials per participant. Every trial where the child selected the target object was 
given a score of one.  If the child selected the foil object (i.e. the object with which the child 
and R had previously jointly engaged), this was given a score of zero. If the child picked up 




both objects and put them both into the box, this was also given a score of zero. If the child 
was already touching an object when R walked into the room, this trial was coded as 
‘unscoreable’ and hence missing data.  This occurred on 0.7% of trials. For this reason 
proportion scores were used for the object-selection dependent variable. Children sometimes 
also made clarification requests (e.g. ‘Which ball?’). These were transcribed and the 
frequency with which they were made was taken as a measure of uncertainty.  
 Each child experienced three experimental trials. Target object location was 
counterbalanced so it was on the left-hand side of the child two out of three times for half of 
each group (and one out of three times for the other half of each group). We also 
counterbalanced across participants which object of a pair (e.g. flashing ball vs. spiky ball) 
was the target. There were six pairs of possible objects. The particular three pairs used for a 
particular participant was counterbalanced across participants. All objects were familiar to 
this age group in the UK at the time of testing, and were found in pilot testing to usually be of 
interest to autistic children.  
 
Interlocutor-generic perspective-taking conditions 
Prior to each interlocutor-generic trial, R made an excuse (e.g. ‘Oh, I think I’ve 
forgotten my keys in the cloakroom. Back in a second.’) and left the room. In the interlocutor-
generic ‘what-perceived’ condition, E2 then placed two objects in front of the child.  An 
opaque cardboard occluder was placed in front of one object so that it could not be seen from 
R’s perspective. When R reappeared in the doorway, she was initially looking in her box of 
toys. She then looked up and said in an offhand manner ‘Ah, I’ve been looking for that [TOY 
NAME, e.g. ball]. Since R stood equidistant from the two potential referents and was wearing 
dark glasses, this utterance was always ambiguous if the child did not take into account that 
one object was hidden from R’s perspective. The target was the non-occluded object. The 




particular three object pairs assigned to a participant was counterbalanced across participants. 
Some of the object pairs overlapped with the experimental condition and some overlapped 
with the other interlocutor-generic perspective-taking condition outlined below.  
In the second interlocutor-generic perspective-taking condition, the child needed to 
take into account how the interlocutor perceived the objects that, in reality, were always 
white. In these trials, E2 placed two objects in front of the child, whereby a transparent colour 
filter occluder (along the lines of that used in Moll and Meltzoff, 2011) was placed in front of 
one object so that it appeared to be a different colour (red, yellow or blue) from R’s 
perspective. An example trial is shown in Fig 1 below. When R reappeared in the doorway, 
she was initially looking in her box of toys. She then looked up in a distracted manner and 
said in an offhand manner ‘Ah, I’ve been looking for that ADJECTIVE [TOY NAME, e.g. blue 
balloon]. For one of the three trials per participant, the colour adjective used was ‘white’ and 
thus the non-filtered object was the target. For the other two interlocutor-generic ‘how-
perceived’ trials per participant, the colour adjective specified the filtered object. Since R 
stood equidistant from the two potential referents and was wearing dark glasses, this 
utterance was always ambiguous if the child did not take into account that one object was not 
white from R’s perspective. For all interlocutor-generic ‘how-perceived’ trials, the target was 
the object that matched the colour from R’s perspective.   
Across the six control trials (three for interlocutor-generic-‘what’ and three for 
interlocutor-generic-‘how’ perspective-taking) the target object side was counterbalanced 
within and across participants. The specific object of a pair that was a target was also 
counterbalanced across participants. As for the experimental condition, every control trial 
where the child selected the target object was given a score of one.  Similarly, if the child 
selected the foil object or both objects and put them both into the box, this was also given a 
score of zero. As for the experimental condition, if the child was already touching an object 




when R walked into the room, this trial was coded as ‘unscoreable’. Two additional situations 
occasionally occurred in the control conditions, resulting in unscoreable trials: 1) if the child 
pulled both objects out from behind the screens before the test question was asked or 2) if the 
child indicated that he or she was revealing information to R (e.g. by moving the object from 
behind the opaque barrier and saying, for example, ‘there’s this one as well’). Over the 
interlocutor-generic trials, 3% of trials were unscoreable for object choice and thus we used 
proportion scores. In addition to object choice,  - as for the experimental condition -  we also 
scored the usage of clarification questions in the control conditions.  
 
Fig 1: View from the perspective of the participant (here: in an interlocutor-generic condition) 
 
 
Post-test compliance control task 
Because we were worried that autistic children might differ from neuro-typical controls at the 
group level in terms of their desire to comply with experimenter requests per se, at the end of 
the entire testing session, each participant participated in three ‘compliance control’ trials. In 
this trials, they were asked to put one of a pair of objects (different lexical types e.g. robot vs. 
helicopter) into the box. All participants scored 100% on compliance. 
 





The first author coded all the trials for object choice. A second coder scored object choice for 
77% of the dataset. Agreement was very good between the two coders (Cohen’s k = .88). The 
first author also transcribed and counted all clarification requests (e.g. ‘Which one?’) and a 
second coder coded eight of the 48 children (i.e. 17% of data), with excellent inter-rater 
agreement (ICC = .952, p < .001).  
 
  Results 
Research Question 1: Are autistic children impaired relative to neuro-typical controls in 
taking the ‘excitement at the new’ into account when interpreting referring expressions? 
Control interlocutor-generic perspective-taking measures 
Table 2 shows the performance of autistic and neuro-typical participants in the two 
interlocutor-generic perspective-taking control tasks.  There were no between-groups 
differences for either object choice or frequency of clarification questions for either the 
‘what’ or ‘how’ interlocutor-generic perspective-taking tasks.  Table 2 shows that all effect 
sizes for between-groups differences were small in magnitude.  Both groups of participants 
selected the correct object at levels significantly above chance, with effects that were large in 
magnitude, all ts > 4.99, all ps < .001, all ds > 1.02. Success on these tasks among autistic 
participants fits with previous literature examining how listeners utilise information about 
what the speaker sees when interpreting referring expressions (Begeer et al., 2010; 
Santiesteban et al., 2015; Volden et al., 1997). In the context of the current study, it suggests 
that any significant between-groups difference in our experimental condition cannot be 
explained by demands of engaging with a referential communication task. 
 




Table 2: Between-groups comparisons for the interlocutor-generic perspective-taking control 
measures 
 Autistic  Neuro-typical   
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p d 
WHAT: object choice (proportion 
correct) 
.79 (.26) .87 (.26) .27 0.13 
HOW: object choice (proportion correct) .79 (.28) .90 (.17) .10 0.47 
WHAT: clarification requests (raw 
frequency) 
.83 (1.09) .58 (1.21) .46 0.22 
HOW: clarification requests (raw 
frequency) 
1.29 (2.79) .88 (1.94) .55 0.17 
 
Experimental ‘excited about the new’ condition 
Autistic participants (M = .63, SD = .39) selected the correct object (i.e., the one that was new 
for the Requester) significantly less frequently than did neuro-typical participants (M = .81, 
SD = .23), (t(23) = 2.06, p < .05, d = 0.57). The neuro-typical children selected the target 
object at well above chance levels, associated with a large effect size (t(23) = 6.77, p < .001, 
d = 1.38), which shows that they assumed that R was excited about and commenting on the 
object that was new for her. In contrast, the performance of the autistic group did not differ 
from chance, t(23) = 1.59, p = .13, d = 0.32), indicating that as a group autistic children did 
not necessarily make this assumption.  The same results were found for our clarification 
request measure. The autistic group asked significantly more clarification questions in our 
‘excited about the new’ experimental task (M = 1.67, SD = 1.50) than did the neuro-typical 
group (M = 0.79, SD = 1.10), t(23) = 2.31, p < .05, d = 0.67, indicating that they showed 
greater uncertainty as to R’s referential intent. In sum, we find support for our hypothesis that 




autistic children struggle, relative to neuro-typical controls, to consider what is new for the 
interlocutor when interpreting referring expressions.  
     
Table 3: Between-groups comparison for the experimental ‘excitement at the new’ condition 
 Autistic  Neuro-typical   
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p d 
Object choice (proportions) .63 (.39) .81 (.23) .045 0.57 
Clarification requests (raw frequency) 1.67 (1.50) .79 (1.10) .026 0.67 
    
Research Question 2: Are autistic difficulties in taking ‘excitement at the new’ into account 
related to difficulties with affect recognition? 
One plausible reason why the autistic children differed significantly from well-
matched controls on our experimental task is that success may have required the ability to 
interpret R’s excited affect. The between-groups difference in affect recognition on the 
NEPSY II was not significant (t(46) = 1.40, p = .17, d = 0.40). The mean scaled scores for 
both groups surrounded the population mean of 10 (autistic M = 9.79, SD = 2.52; neuro-
typical M = 10.83; SD = 2.67).  More importantly, we examined whether performance on the 
NEPSY task correlated with performance in the experimental (interlocutor-specific 
perspective-taking) condition. This was not the case for the autistic group, nor for the neuro-
typical group, nor for the groups conflated (see Table 5 below for effect sizes). Thus, it is 









Table 4. Performance on affect recognition  
 Autistic  
(n = 24;  
18 males) 
Neuro-typical  
(n = 24;      
18 males) 
 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p d 




Performance in the experimental (interlocutor-specific perspective-taking) task was also not 
correlated for the autistic group with either age, non-verbal IQ, receptive language, affect 
recognition, autistic symptoms or Theory of Mind). The same is true for the neuro-typical 
group.2 See Table 5 below for all relationships with the experimental measure dependent 











                                                          
2 The same pattern of results was found if tau was used rather than Pearson’s r. 




Table 5: Correlations with the ‘excitement at the new’ dependent variables, by group 


































.09 .31 .16 -.05 -.24 .36*  
Age in 
months 
-.05 -.20 .15 -.06 .00 -.10  









The current study was the first to test whether autistic children have difficulty interpreting 
referring expressions in a tasks that goes beyond requiring basic, interlocutor-generic 
perspective taking. In the current study, the participants had to consider which element was 
new to the discourse from the speaker’s perspective (given shared past experience) in order to 
correctly interpret otherwise ambiguous use of referring expressions (i.e. ‘that ball’ when 
both speaker and listener could see two balls).  We compared 24 eight- to eleven-year-olds 
autistic children with 24 well-matched neuro-typical controls. For both dependent variables 
(object choice and clarification questions), we found significant differences between the 
groups, indicating that while neuro-typical children assumed that the Requesting 
Experimenter was excited about and referring to the object that was new for her, the autistic 
group was less likely to do so. In contrast, for the interlocutor-generic perspective-taking 
control tasks, there were no significant between group differences for either dependent 
variable. This aligns with the previous four reference interpretation studies with autistic 
individuals (Begeer et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2015; Schuh et al., 2016; Volden et al., 
1997).  
 
Accounting for autistic difficulties with interlocutor-specific perspective-taking  
 This raises the question of what exactly constitutes the difficulty that autistic 
individuals had in our ‘excitement about the new’ experimental task. A number of non-
mutually exclusive possibilities warrant further exploration. To succeed on our task, one 
needs to 1) retrieve a memory about a specific interlocutor’s experience, 2) understand the 
emotional tone of the test question and emotional affect of the speaker and 3) understand that 
people comment on new things. Malkin et al. (2018b) already established autistic children can 
retrieve a memory about a specific interlocutor’s experience. Indeed, all bar one of our 




participants passed a First Order False Belief test, which is accepted as being 
developmentally subsequent to Knowledge-Access (Pratt & Bryant, 1990). However, either 
of the other points may be challenging for a child on the autism spectrum, as might juggling 
all these constraints at once.  
 We think it unlikely that the difficulties of the autistic group can be reduced to basic 
facial affect recognition. First, There were no group-level differences in non-verbal affect 
interpretation as assessed by the standardised NEPSY task.  Second, there was no relationship 
between the autistic group’s performance in the interlocutor-specific condition and their 
NEPSY affect recognition scores. However, while there is no clear-cut evidence that autistic 
individuals are necessarily impaired in behavioural measures of affect recognition, review 
papers tend to find much clearer evidence of affect recognition impairments when using 
electrophysiological, eye-tracking or brain imaging measures (e.g. Harms et al., 2010). Thus, 
one possibility which needs further exploration is whether autistic children find it more 
difficult than do neuro-typical children to integrate an interpretation of emotion with the 
interpretation of reference. A second possibility for future investigation is whether difficulties 
interpreting the emotional tone of the speaker’s request might have contributed to diminished 
performance in our autistic group (although a number of studies suggest comparable 
performance for autistic children and neuro-typical controls when using prosody to interpret 
pragmatic intent, see e.g. Wang, Lee, Sigman & Dapretto, 2016). 
 One aspect of our interlocutor-specific perspective-taking task which probably did 
pose difficulties for autistic children is the need to be sensitive to the fact that the requester 
was more likely to comment on the object that was new (for her). That is, in Clark et al.’s 
(1983) terms, the object which is new to the discourse is assumed to be more salient. This is 
taken for granted by neuro-typical children in the earliest stages of language acquisition (e.g., 
Akthar, Carpenter & Tomasello, 1996; Bannard, Rosner & Matthews, 2017; Tomasello & 




Akthar, 1995) and even pre-linguistically (Moll & Tomasello, 2007; O’Neill & Happé, 2000). 
Indeed, the tendency of neuro-typical language users to comment on elements which are new 
to the discourse is so strong that certain patterns are typologically marked (e.g. DuBois, 1987, 
see also Chafe, 1976). However, it is not something that is demonstrated by preschool autistic 
children (O’Neill & Happé, 2000).  
One possibility here is that if an autistic individual is not him or herself necessarily 
more interested in elements which are new to the discourse, then he or she should find it more 
difficult than a neuro-typical children to simulate that their interlocutor finds the new object 
more salient. Another possibility is that some autistic children do themselves find new objects 
more interesting but do not necessarily realise that people tend to comment on new rather 
than given elements in the discourse. Either of these possibilities would have profound 
consequences for spontaneous conversation and might in fact be related to impairments in 
conversation skills more generally, including a tendency to monologue on favourite topics 
(e.g. Nadig, Lee, Singh, Bosshart & Ozonoff, 2011). It is therefore critical that future studies 
attempt to tease apart the source of this difficulty.  
 
Limitations and considerations for future research 
We did not find any correlations between our Theory of Mind measures, on the one 
hand, and with the ability to interpret referring expressions on the experimental task, on the 
other hand; not even in the experimental condition requiring interlocutor-specific perspective-
taking, which arguably requires mentalising of some sort. This might because each Theory of 
Mind task and each of our experimental perspective-taking tasks assesses different aspects of 
mentalising. That is, it may be that children master each aspect of social cognition in a fairly 
piecemeal way. An alternative test, such as Reading the Mind in the Eyes (Baron-Cohen, 




Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) for example, might correlate with interlocutor-
specific perspective-taking.  
One limitation of the current study is that we were unable to control the prosody of 
the test questions absolutely, because they were uttered ‘live’ by the Requester. A second 
limitation is that due to our sample size of 48, we were only able to compare the autistic and 
neuro-typical children at the group level.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
In sum, the current study is the first to demonstrate empirically that autistic children are have 
greater difficulties than do neuro-typicals in the interpretation of referring expressions. We 
argue that the reason this is the first such demonstration is that the aspect of perspective-
taking manipulated in our task requires a deeper level of consideration of the mental states 
than the perspectives and degree of requisite cue interpretation manipulated in previous 
studies. Future research is needed to investigate which particular components of interlocutor-
specific perspective-taking pose difficulties for autistic individuals.  
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Theory of Mind Composite  
Our Theory of Mind composite was administered in a stepwise manner (see Charman 
et al., 2011, for a similar procedure). We first administered a test of second order Theory of 
Mind developed by Sullivan, Zaitchik & Tager-Flusberg (1994), accompanied by pictures, in 
which a mother has a false belief about the mental state of the son (i.e. she doesn’t know that 
he knows that she has bought him a puppy for this birthday). At the end of the story the tester 
asks the child three questions about what the mother will tell another person, if she is asked 
whether her son knows what he is getting for his birthday. If the child failed all of the above 
second-order false belief test questions, the test administrator administered a first order 
‘change of location’ false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). If, however, the 
child passed two out of three second order false belief questions, he or she was credited with 
passing first order false belief. Finally, we administered one item (‘Kittens’) from Happé 
(1994), in which the child is told a story and then asked why a protagonist lied. The answer is 
scored on a three-point scale in terms of the child’s ability to explain that the protagonist wishes 
to persuade another person to do something. We also used Happé’s (1994) physical inferencing 
burglar and mouse story as a control for inferencing ability per se. Only one typically-developing 
child and three autistic children failed this measure.  
 
